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Defining Power Property
Expectations
by Michael Pappas
Michael Pappas is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.

I.

Introduction

To date, most government efforts to promote distributed
solar energy have involved incentivizing property owners to
undertake voluntary installations. However, that approach
is changing, as government actors move to increase distributed solar generation capacity not only through incentive
programs, but also through requirements. Such a change
from voluntary to mandatory measures represents a seismic
shift in the approach to encouraging distributed solar generation, and it may raise objections about interference with
property expectations.
The Comment addresses those concerns by exploring
the nature of property expectations in the energy context and analyzing how courts and legislatures have balanced property expectations against past government
measures to encourage energy production and development of underexploited resources. The Comment
concludes that throughout the history of energy development in the United States, property owners’ expectations have been understood to accommodate socially
beneficial energy production, and that the concerns surrounding the promotion of distributed solar generation
counsel a similar approach.

II.

Promoting Distributed Solar
Installation

Distributed solar generation, such as solar installations on
residential or commercial rooftops, represents an energy
resource with great potential. Using largely unharnessed
areas of already developed properties for on-site energy
generation presents overlapping benefits, such as increased
clean energy production without additional energy sprawl
or transmission concerns.1 Moreover, if many distributed
"VUIPST/PUFǲJT$PNNFOUJTCBTFEPOSFNBSLTBUUIF"TTPDJBUJPO
PG "NFSJDBO -BX 4DIPPMT /BUVSBM 3FTPVSDFT BOE &OFSHZ 4FDUJPO
BOOVBMDPOGFSFODF
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solar energy sources are aggregated, that can lead to a substantial cumulative societal benefit.
Aggregating distributed solar sources, however, is
an inherent challenge to maximizing their benefit. To
reach the full potential of this energy source, both in
terms of production capacity and in terms of network
or microgrid efficiencies,2 requires mass participation.
Quite simply, the more distributed generators there are,
the greater the impact of distributed generation. But
because distributed power sources are, almost by definition, located across multiple properties with multiple
owners, the installation of mass-distributed generation
capacity requires the coordinated activity of multiple
private actors, which can be difficult.
As a relatively new energy technology, distributed solar
installation has had some success, but it still faces the challenges that many new technologies face in achieving broad
acceptance. Some property owners are uncertain about
adopting the technology, due to concerns over reliability,
uncertainty about benefits relative to costs, or even cognitive barriers that prevent rational investment.3 Further,
the lack of adoption may be self-perpetuating, with some
property owners waiting for widespread acceptance before
investing themselves, while others await the price drop that
will likely accompany increased production of solar panels.
Finally, others may simply not wish to invest at all, perhaps because they believe that rooftop solar installations
are not aesthetically pleasing or because they are unlikely
to directly realize the benefits.4 Whatever the cause, widespread adoption of distributed solar generation has not yet
been realized, and the full potential of the resource has
been hampered by the assembly problems frequently asso-

1.
2.
3.
4.

See generally Michael Pappas, Energy Versus Property, 41 Fla. St. U. L. Rev.
435, 439-41 (discussing benefits of distributed generation) [hereinafter Pappas, Energy].
See, e.g., Sara C. Bronin, Curbing Energy Sprawl With Microgrids, 43 Conn.
L. Rev. 547, 559 (2010) (discussing microgrids and their benefits).
See Pappas, Energy, supra note 1, at 441-43.
See, e.g., id. at 442 (“Landlords often have no incentive to invest in energy
efficiency or renewable energy because the tenant pays the utility bill.”).
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ciated with attempts to coordinate the actions of multiple
individual parties.5
Recognizing these assembly problems, some state
and local governments have undertaken efforts to speed
the adoption of distributed solar generation by offering
incentive programs such as subsidies or tax breaks.6 Some
states have even counted distributed solar generation
toward utilities’ Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS)
requirements.7 Consistently, these efforts to promote
distributed solar generation have involved measures to
encourage voluntary adoption. The policies incentivize solar installation, but they do not require it,8 leaving
individual property owners to decide for themselves and
thus doing relatively little to alleviate the assembly problems in achieving mass adoption.
The voluntariness approach is changing, however, with
some jurisdictions going beyond incentives for voluntary
installation and instead seeking to achieve widespread
distributed solar generation through mandates. A number of recent codes and ordinances in California illustrate
the rise of such requirements for distributed solar installation. First, California’s statewide building code includes
the 2013 California Building Energy Efficiency Standards,
which became effective July 1, 2014.9 Section 110.10 of
the Standards provides “mandatory requirements for solarready buildings,” including requirements for “solar-ready”
rooftops that “make[ ] space available” for “easier installation” of solar cells.10
Second, in March 2013, the city of Lancaster, located
about 70 miles north of Los Angeles, became the “first U.S.
city to require solar [installations]” on all new homes.11
5.

For a fuller discussion of assembly problems, see, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill
& Henry E. Smith, Property: Principles and Policies 39 (2d ed. 2012).
6. See Database of State Incentives for Renewables or Efficiency
(DSIRE), http://www.dsireusa.org (aggregating information on state
incentive programs).
7. See California Renewable Portfolio Standard Eligibility Guidebook 7 (2010)
(discussing credit available for distributed generation, and noting that further guidance will be available in the future), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2010publications/CEC-300-2010-007/CEC-300-2010-007CMF.PDF.
8. Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPSs) impose mandatory requirements
on investor-owned utilities, electric service providers, or aggregators. (For
more information on California measures, visit the California Public Utilities Commission web page, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/Renewables/.) While such RPSs essentially create or enhance a market for renewables production, they do not actually require the production of renewables
on the individual level. Thus, any individual producer of renewable energy
still has the option to choose whether or not to produce renewable energy.
9. 2013 California Building Energy Efficiency Standards, available at http://
www.energy.ca.gov/2012publications/CEC-400-2012-004/CEC-400-2012004-CMF-REV2.pdf.
10. For a more detailed discussion of these standards, see Pappas, Energy, supra
note 1, at 444.
11. For more information, visit Lancaster, California’s, website, http://www.
cityoflancasterca.org/index.aspx?page=1279 (with links available to updated city zoning ordinance as well as “residential solar initiative”); see
also Herman K. Trabish, -BODBTUFS  $" #FDPNFT 'JSTU 64 $JUZ UP 3FRVJSF
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Enacting solar requirements through its zoning ordinance,
the city requires an average of one kilowatt of solar production per residential home, either through on-site production or through purchase of credits from other solar
installations in the city.12
Finally, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors passed a
resolution entitled Solar Vision 2020, which “requires solar
installation on all new construction or substantial retrofits
in the City,”13 though the resolution, which has the force
of an ordinance, tempers its requirements by mandating
solar installation only “where feasible.”14 It was enacted in
November 2014, but as of this writing, the implementation details were still being developed by San Francisco’s
Department of the Environment, consistent with the resolution’s language.15
Taken together, the California measures demonstrate a
trend toward promotion of distributed solar installations
through mandates, rather than merely through property
owners’ voluntary action or incentives.

III. Tension With Private-Property
Expectations
The California examples, as well as any other mandates
for installation of distributed solar technologies such as
solar hot water systems in Hawaii and Puerto Rico,16 represent a new governmental push toward mass-distributed
solar development and an important step toward overcoming assembly problems. But they also raise questions
about how these requirements impact individual property
rights. Individual autonomy, particularly reflected through
a right to exclude persons from and control uses of one’s
own property, is thought to be a core element of private

12.
13.
14.

15.
16.

Solar, GreenTech Media, Mar. 27, 2013, at http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/Lancaster-CA-Becomes-First-US-City-to-RequireSolar. See also Felicity Barringer, 8JUI )FMQ 'SPN /BUVSF  B 5PXO "JNT
to Be a Solar Capital, N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 2013, at http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/04/09/us/lancaster-calif-focuses-on-becoming-solar-capital-ofuniverse.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1.
See City of Lancaster, 4QSFBEJOH4VOTIJOF"MM0WFSUIF1MBDF, Residential
Solar Initiative, http://www.cityoflancasterca.org/index.aspx?page=1279.
The resolution is available at the San Francisco Board of Supervisors website,
http://www.sfbos.org/ftp/uploadedfiles/bdsupvrs/resolutions14/r0406-14.
pdf.
Id. (“The Board of Supervisors support[s] the requirement of solar installations and/or rooftop gardens on all new construction or substantial
retrofits in San Francisco where feasible, and urges the Department of the
Environment to convene stakeholders to propose how this requirement
be implemented.”).
Id.
See Haw. Rev. Stat. §196-6.5 (“Solar water heater system required for
new single-family residential construction”); U.S. Department of Energy,
Puerto Rico Building Energy Code With Mandatory Solar Hot Water Heating,
http://energy.gov/savings/puerto-rico-building-energy-code-mandatorysolar-water-heating. See also Pappas, Energy, supra note 1, at 485 (discussing other mandates).
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property.17 Measures mandating installation of solar technologies limit owners’ abilities to exclude or control uses,
and thus revisit a core tension found in property law: balancing strong individual autonomy principles18 with more
societally focused goals and values.19 As a result, mandates
may raise strong feelings and significant objections about
infringement on private-property rights.
Reducing conceptual concerns with property rights to
the most concrete claim that may arise, property owners
who object to mandatory rooftop solar installations may
claim that such requirements amount to a taking of their
property, evoking the canonical Loretto decision establishing that a regulation compelling physical invasion
of property is a per se taking under the Fifth Amendment.20 In Loretto, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a
New York City ordinance requiring property owners to
allow cable boxes on their roofs constituted a compensable taking of property because the regulation required
a third-party physical invasion and thus a curtailment of
the “right to exclude” that is central to private property.
Property owners upset with required solar installations
might claim that mandatory solar panels on a rooftop
present a strikingly similar fact pattern and represent the
same invasion of the right to exclude. Thus, such property
owners may argue that mandatory solar rooftop installations constitute a per se taking of property rights and
require compensation.
In response to such claims, states and municipalities
could engage in case-by-case defenses, highlighting specific
factual differences to distinguish their distributed generation requirements from the situation at issue in Loretto.21
While arguments based on distinguishing the facts may
be convincing and may ultimately prevail, it is not certain
ex ante that a court would accept such lines of distinction;
accordingly, the risk of potential Takings Clause liability
may chill governments from adopting requirements for
distributed generation. To supplement factual arguments
distinguishing Loretto, the next section offers a broader
context for understanding how such mandates fit with
property expectations, particularly when understood in
light of past government efforts to promote similar development of important resources.

17. See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra note 5, at 16.
18. William Blackstone, 2 Commentaries 1 (characterizing property as “that
sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the
external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other
individual in the universe.”).
19. See, e.g., David Schorr, How Blackstone Became a Blackstonian, 10 Theoretical Inquiries L. 103, 104-05, nn.2-3 (2009) (describing juxtaposition of
Blackstonian view with more “community-oriented property law” theories).
20. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
21. The Loretto opinion specifically noted that a per se taking would not arise
from “the State’s power to require . . . compl[iance] with building codes
and provi[sion of ] utility connections, mailboxes, smoke detectors, fire extinguishers, and the like.” Id. at 440. Government actors could argue that
distributed generation requirements are similar to such building codes or
utility connections and thus do not create per se takings liability.

IV.

6-2015

Property Expectations in Context

Government efforts to promote the development of energy
resources date back to the earliest fuel sources, and many
of these efforts imposed limitations on private-property
owners’ rights to exclude and their general autonomy. For
centuries, courts and legislatures have been forced to balance private-property expectations against the needs of
energy development, and consistently the result has been
that private-property protections must yield to important
resource needs.
For example, as discussed below, measures to promote
production of energy resources across property lines have
curtailed property owners’ rights to exclude, and courts
have upheld the measures and found no takings liability. Additionally, anti-waste measures have limited the
autonomy of private-property owners and steered property uses to promote the development of underutilized
resources; there, too, courts have held that the measures
are valid and noncompensable. This section examines both
types of measures limiting property expectations in favor
of resource development, and applies them to the context
of mandatory solar installation, ultimately finding that the
same underlying justifications also apply in the distributed
solar context.

A.

Energy Development and the Right to Exclude

Throughout the nation’s history, courts and legislatures
have promoted energy development through measures that
have limited property owners’ rights to exclude.22 This has
particularly been the case when the establishment, development, or expansion of an energy resource has required
overcoming assembly problems and linking or spanning
multiple different properties. Two specific examples are the
Mill Acts, which promoted early hydropower development;
and forced pooling and unitization laws, which aided in oil
and gas extraction.
Throughout the 1800s, legislative passage and judicial
application of Mill Acts demonstrated how American
property law was seen to prioritize energy production and
development over landowners’ rights to exclude.23 The
laws encouraged the development of water mills, which
harnessed kinetic hydropower generated by water continuously flowing from dam-controlled reservoirs. Building
reservoirs to establish or expand water mills frequently
caused flooding of neighboring lands, leading to property
claims that threatened to curtail water mill development.24
To resolve disputes and allow continued expansion of
hydropower sources, state legislatures passed Mill Acts
limiting potential causes of action and remedies for the
flooding. For example, the acts disallowed neighbors from
bringing trespass actions and thus foreclosed the oppor22. See generally Pappas, Energy, supra note 1.
23. Id. at 460.
24. See Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 17801860, at 47 (1977).

Copyright © 2015 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
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tunity for neighbors to enjoin the flooding; moreover, the
acts even allowed mill owners to escape liability altogether
by showing that, on balance, the mill benefitted the complaining neighbor.25 In essence, these acts restricted neighboring property owners’ rights to exclude the impacts of
water mill development. In upholding the Mill Acts against
challenges, courts stressed that, at the margins, a property
owner’s right to exclude must yield to the important social
necessity of energy development.26
Modern courts have employed similar reasoning in
upholding measures that limit the right to exclude to promote development of oil and gas resources. For example,
through forced pooling and unitization statutes, state legislatures have required neighboring landowners whose property overlies continuous oil or gas reservoirs to join together
in extracting hydrocarbon energy resources through cooperative wells.27 Even though the landowners have different
property tracts, each with its own surface boundaries as
well as its own rights to withdraw oil and gas, these statutes
force cooperation to promote more efficient and complete
access to the oil and gas resources.28
Such acts serve not only to force recalcitrant landowners to extract energy resources when they otherwise
would not do so, but also to require unwilling landowners to accommodate third-party physical invasion, such as
trucks, pipelines, and wells, of the surface and subsurface
of their properties.29 Despite these significant compromises of the right to exclude, the laws have been uniformly
upheld and found to trigger no compensation liability for
Takings Clause challenges, all based on the reasoning that
the right to exclude can be constitutionally limited for the

25. Id. at 48; Pappas, Energy, supra note 1, at 460.
26. See, e.g., Fiske v. Framingham Mfg. Co., 29 Mass. (1 Pick.) 68, 70-71
(1831), noting that the Mill Acts were:
designed to provide for the most useful and beneficial occupation
and enjoyment of natural streams and water-courses, where the absolute right of each proprietor, to use his own land and water privileges, at his own pleasure, cannot be fully enjoyed, and one must of
necessity, in some degree, yield to the other.
27. See Pappas, Energy, supra note 1, at 465-74.
28. See generally 1 Bruce M. Kramer & Patrick R. Martin, The Law of
Pooling and Unitization §6.02 (3d ed. 1989). For representative compulsory unitization statutes, see, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. §§15-72-308 to 1572-315; Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§3640 et seq.; Kan. Stat. Ann. §§55-1301
et seq.; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §30:5; Miss. Code Ann. §53-3-7; N.M. Stat.
Ann. §§70-7-1 et seq.; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 52, §§287.1 et seq.; and Wyo.
Stat. §30-5-110.
29. For example, New Mexico recognizes rights of well operators to enter and
use the surface or land within a force-unitized area even when not part of
the operator’s lease, and even though the same entry onto non-unitized
land would constitute trespass. Kysar v. Amoco Prod. Co., 93 P.3d 1272,
1282 (N.M. 2004). See also Continental Res., Inc. v. Farrar Oil Co., 559
N.W.2d 841 (N.D. 1997)) (holding that even though a force-pooled tract
suffered a subsurface physical invasion, the invasion did not amount to
trespass or a compensable claim because the forced pooling statute superseded such property law principles). See also Pappas, Energy, supra
note 1, at 469-72. $G Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust,
268 S.W.3d 1, 11-17 (Tex. 2008) (holding that a hydraulic fracturing
operation that crossed property lines two miles below the surface, injected
materials under the neighbor’s lands, and withdrew gas from under the
neighbor’s land created no actionable trespass absent injury to the surface
of the land).
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purpose of conserving and utilizing publicly beneficial
energy resources.30

B.

Anti-Waste Measures and Autonomy

In addition to limiting property owners’ rights to exclude,
laws have also limited landowners’ autonomy regarding
the use of resources through “anti-waste” measures.31
Such laws have particularly been applied to spur the
development of underused or developing resource bases
that have not been tapped to their full societal potential.
The purpose of such legal measures is to eliminate wasteful underuse by requiring that certain resources be more
effectively harnessed.
Much of the history of American water law reflects such
a concern with eliminating wasteful underuse of water
resources, and the development of water law regimes reflects
a shifting of property expectations to allow and encourage
resource use. For example, the development of American
water law from the English natural-flow doctrine to the
doctrine of reasonable-use riparian rights represented a
legal transition that curtailed the property expectations of
downstream landowners in order to encourage expanded
use and withdrawal of water resources that were perceived
as underutilized.32
Under the original English system, property owners
along a watercourse had an expectation in the undiminished flow of water past the property; as a result, a downstream landowner could assert a property right to prevent
an upstream owner from withdrawing water. Because
this system limited water use and led to perceived wasteful underuse of water, American states altered property
expectations to embrace the riparian rights system, which
allowed all owners of land abutting or containing a watercourse (that is, “riparian” land) to make reasonable use of
water, even if that use involved a withdrawal that diminished the flow.33
The riparian rights doctrine worked in the eastern states,
but when it proved insufficient for development in the arid
western states, the rise of the prior appropriations doctrine demonstrated another shift in property expectations
to prevent resource underuse.34 Since riparian land was
30. See, e.g., Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 210-11 (1900) (emphasizing that a state’s police power allowed it to prevent the waste of
energy resources and allowed state legislatures to define property rights
not to include wasteful extraction of the resources); Champlin Refining
Co. v. Corporation Comm’n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 233-34 (1932);
Palmer Oil Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 231 P.2d 997, 1004-05
(Okla. 1951) (upholding compulsory unitization statutes); Patterson v.
Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 77 P.2d 83, 95 (Okla. 1938) (upholding compulsory pooling statutes).
31. See Michael Pappas, "OUJ8BTUF, 56 Ariz. L. Rev. 741, 771-78 (2014).
32. See, e.g., Harris v. Brooks, 283 S.W.2d 129, 132-33 (Ark. 1955) (discussing the nature of the natural-flow doctrine and the riparian reasonable-use
doctrine, and rejecting the natural-flow approach in favor of a riparian reasonable-use regime in order to promote “the benefits accruing to society in
general from a maximum utilization of our water resources.”).
33. Id.; see also Pappas, "OUJ8BTUF, supra note 31, at 776-77.
34. See, e.g., In re Adjudication of the Existing Rights to the Use of All the
Water, 2002 MT 216, ¶ 9, 311 Mont. 327, 332, 55 P.3d 396, 399 (Mont.
2002):

Copyright © 2015 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
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relatively scarce in the West, the riparian rights doctrine,
which limited water rights to use on riparian tracts, led to
underuse of water and impediments to land development.35
The prior appropriation doctrine sought to eliminate this
underuse by decoupling water rights from the ownership
of riparian land and instead grounding water rights in the
diversion and beneficial use of water.36 Further, the prior
appropriations doctrine defined it as “wasteful” to allow
water to flow by unused,37 further encouraging the use
of water and premising the continued existence of water
rights on continued beneficial use of the water.38 As this
history reflects, each of these transitions in the development of American water law involved altering a property
expectation to correct a perceived underuse of a resource,
thereby prioritizing resource development over previously
held autonomy interests.
Similarly, the development of the adverse possession
doctrine, particularly as applied to wild lands, represents
a legal measure designed to combat perceived underuse of

35.
36.

37.

38.

Miners in California developed a water use system as an alternative
to the riparian water system prevalent in England and the eastern
United States. While riparians allowed owners of land abutting the
water source to control it, the more arid climes of the American
West required a different approach. Prior appropriation, adapting
flexibly to the needs of a developing society, allowed diversion to a
distant location and simply required use of the water for a beneficial
purpose. Western states adopted the miners’ customs through both
court decisions and codification, and the doctrine of prior appropriation became the law of the western states.
(citing A. Stone, Selected Aspects of Montana Water Law 7 (1978);
Christine A. Klein, ǲF$POTUJUVUJPOBM.ZUIPMPHZPG8FTUFSO8BUFS-BX, 14
Va. Envtl. L.J. 343, 347-48 (1995)). See also Charles F. Wilkinson,
Crossing the Next Meridian: Land, Water, and the Future of the
West 231-35 (1992).
See In re Adjudication of the Existing Rights to the Use of All the Water,
supra note 34, 55 P.3d at 399.
Id.:
The common law elements of a valid appropriation are intent,
notice, diversion and application to beneficial use. However, in
Montana, as in many western states, the flexibility of the prior
appropriation doctrine has allowed acquisition of the right to use
a specific amount of water through application of the water to a
beneficial use.
See, e.g., Eskelsen v. Town of Perry, 819 P.2d 770, 775 (Utah 1991) (noting
that western states are “vitally interested in seeing that none of the [state’s]
waters are allowed to run to waste or go without being applied to a beneficial
use”) (citing Deseret Live Stock Co. v. Hooppiania, 239 P. 479, 481 (Utah
1925)). See also 2 Cal. Jur. 3d Water §33 (2005) (“The policy of the state
courts may be summarized to be that the rivers and streams of the state
that waste into the sea should, if possible, be conserved for beneficial uses.”)
(emphasis added).
See, e.g., United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 27 F. Supp. 2d
1230, 1243 (D. Nev. 1998) (“Under the established tenet that a beneficial
use is the measure and limit of a water right, when the necessity for the
use of the water ceases to exist or is reduced, the extent of the water right
is limited to the extent of the beneficial purpose which remains.”); Smith
v. Hawkins, 120 Cal. 86, 52 P. 139, 140 (1898) (“If plaintiffs could forfeit
their entire right of appropriation by nonuser, equally will they be held to
forfeit less than the whole by like failure.”); State v. Hagerman Water Right
Owners, Inc., 947 P.2d 400, 407-08 (Idaho 1997) (holding that partial forfeiture is available in Idaho and that a contrary holding would be inconsistent with the principle of beneficial use); In re Musselshell River Drainage
Area, 255 Mont. 43, 840 P.2d 577, 579 (1992) (“The controlling principle
upon which water ‘rights’ in Montana are perfected and continue to possess
legal validity is that of beneficial use; water rights cease when the water is
no longer applied to a beneficial use.” (internal quotation marks omitted));
In re Birdwood Irrigation Dist., 154 Neb. 52, 46 N.W.2d 884, 888 (1951)
(“We conclude that the power to cancel the whole of an appropriation for
irrigation purposes for nonuser carries with it the right to cancel a part.”).

6-2015

resources, even at the expense of sacrificing autonomy.39
The adverse possession doctrine transfers property title
from a landowner to an adverse possessor if the adverse
possessor demonstrates sufficient use of the land.40 In the
case of wild lands, courts have shown a particular willingness to transfer “unexploited” lands to an adverse-possessing party that has taken measures to develop them.41 By
setting a relatively low bar for transferring title from “idle”
landowners, who left their property in a wild state, to
“industrious” adverse possessors, who made developmental use of the land, the doctrine reflected an attempt to
remedy a perceived underdevelopment of productive land
resources.42 The doctrine poses serious challenges to a landowner’s autonomy to control the use of property and even
institutes a no-liability rule for transferring the title of the
property, but it has nonetheless been upheld and justified
on the basis of spurring beneficial development of an underutilized resource base.43

C.

Exclusion, Autonomy, and Solar Mandates

As the previous sections discuss, when conflicts have
arisen between property expectations on the one hand,
and measures to develop energy sources or tap underutilized resources on the other, courts and legislatures have
emphasized that property expectations must yield to the
socially important energy or underutilization concerns.
Similar energy development and underutilization concerns
animate measures requiring rooftop solar panels, and thus
the same reasoning justifies preempting property owners’
expectations of exclusion or autonomy.
The Mill Acts and forced pooling and unitization measures were necessary to promote energy development in the
face of assembly problems,44 and distributed solar generation faces the same challenges. To reach its potential as an
energy source, distributed generation requires sufficient
installed capacity across multiple property tracts; to build
39. See Pappas, "OUJ8BTUF, supra note 31, at 773-74.
40. See, e.g., John G. Sprankling, "O&OWJSPONFOUBM$SJUJRVFPG"EWFSTF1PTTFTsion, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 816, 824 (1994) (“The successful adverse possessor must hold actual, hostile, exclusive and continuous possession of land
in an open and notorious manner under a claim of right or color of title for
a requisite period.”).
41. Id. at 828-29:
Almost all states allow adverse possession of wild lands based on activities which are inferior in quality and duration to those required
for developed lands. In some states this rule is express: the adverse
possessor of lands which are characterized as “wild,” “outlying and
uncultivated,” unsuited for “any useful permanent improvement”
or “undeveloped,” need only perform the activities which are suited
or adapted to the land in its natural condition. In most states, the
rule is implicit: the adverse possessor must use the land in the same
manner that a reasonable owner would, in light of its nature, character and location.
42. Id. at 821; see also id. at 826 (“Most modern adverse possession decisions
involve claims to either tracts of wild land or disputed border strips in developed areas.”).
43. See, e.g., Pappas, "OUJ8BTUF, supra note 31, at 774.
44. See, e.g., Kramer & Martin, supra note 28, at §1.02 (“The history of oil
and gas development in the United States leads to the inevitable conclusion
that the legal, economic, and engineering worlds have never reached a level
of coordination that would allow for the efficient and equitable development
of oil and gas reservoirs without substantial governmental intervention.”).

Copyright © 2015 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
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this critical mass of energy production requires avoiding
assembly problems and securing the cooperation of numerous individual property owners. Just as measures curtailing
the right to exclude were necessary to force cooperation
across property boundaries in the cases of hydropower
development and oil and gas extraction, so some compromise of the right to exclude may be justified in the case of
distributed solar generation.
Moreover, just as anti-waste measures limited the
autonomy of individual property owners in order to promote development of underused resources, mandates for
solar energy installation seek to tap the underutilized
capacity of rooftops to generate energy. In the same way
that allowing water to flow by without using it was once
considered waste, now the untapped energy potential of
sunlight hitting roofs can also be seen as waste, and government actors may be justified in taking measures to harness the untapped potential, even if doing so imposes some
limits on landowner autonomy. The same challenges that
confronted past resource development now confront the
expansion of distributed solar installations, and the same
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justifications for limiting property expectations to accommodate development of these energy sources are once
again applicable.

V.

Conclusion

Efforts to promote distributed solar generation through
mandates may represent a new direction in the policy to
expand renewable energy capacity, but the approach is not
so novel when considered in light of past energy-promotion
and anti-waste measures. Past experiences provide context
for understanding the balance between property expectations and new requirements for rooftop solar generation,
and they should offer insight for both planners and property owners when considering whether renewable energy
mandates run afoul of property rights. As discussed, there
is a long and consistent history of property expectations
yielding to concerns about energy resource development
and underuse, and with this history in mind, the advent
of mandatory distributed solar appears not to be such a
seismic shift after all.

